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Unlike their underfinanced counterparts, 
venture capital companies (VCCs) are well 
financed and what they lack in technical 
capability, they make up for in business acu-
men and financial wherewithal. Moreover, 
risky investments with large upsides are 
exactly the type of opportunities that can 
produce significant returns for venture 
capital funds.
In the commercial marketplace, many small 
businesses receive venture capital infusions 
to transform their ideas and research into 
viable products.2 This same principle should 
apply to federal procurement, where U.S. 
government procurement policies favor 
small contracting, but early-stage research 
and development funding is difficult to 
come by. VCC investment should be utilized 
to fill the gap between government policy 
and economic reality by supporting early-
stage funding for small businesses. This type 
of investment would increase the pool of po-
tential small businesses for federal procure-
ment and help to diversify the government’s 
contractor portfolio resulting in a positive 
impact on a fundamental tenet of govern-
ment procurement: competition. There are 
technological benefits as well. With the 
assistance of venture capital investments, 
small companies would have the freedom 
to develop cutting-edge technologies for 
the federal government which larger, more 
established corporations may be either 
unwilling or unable to develop.3  
However, the mutually beneficial relation-
ship between small business contractors 
and VCCs has been frustrated due to a 
complicated web of government regulations 
that, while well intended, have the effect of 
holding back promising small businesses in 
the federal marketplace. In this harsh eco-
nomic climate, venture capital is crucial to 
small, innovative businesses. Although VCCs 
have felt the impact of the recession, they 
remain well equipped to aid small concerns4  
and their assistance is imperative.5 As a 
result, now is the time to advance a compro-
mise position that protects small business 
programs while encouraging venture capital 
investment in federal contractors.
small Businesses and Venture Capital are a 
natural pair. While many small Businesses 
are Born of teChniCal expertise and 
innoVation, feW are Well finanCed. one of the 
reasons for this laCk of finanCing is that 
small ConCerns are often VieWed as risky 
inVestments. small Businesses are rarely led 
By experienCed Business people and, as many 
statistiCs demonstrate, are more likely than 
not to fail.1 
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affiliation
Federal agencies are encouraged to set 
aside contracts for small businesses. These 
set asides limit competition to small 
businesses based on employee- or revenue-
based metrics.6 Standing alone, the small 
businesses that receive venture capital 
investment are, in fact, “small” as mea-
sured by employees or revenue. Similarly, 
venture capital firms are often, at least by 
number of employees, thinly staffed small 
businesses. However, many small business-
es that receive investments from similarly 
small VCCs are deemed to be “large,” and, 
as a result, ineligible for set-aside awards by 
the Small Business Administration (SBA). If 
both VCC firms and their investment targets 
are small, why is there a barrier to investing 
in small businesses that perform set-aside 
contracts? The answer is “affiliation.”  
Affiliation is a concept developed to prevent 
small firms that are closely related to large 
firms from being awarded small business 
contracts, and requires SBA to analyze a 
company’s size status by adding together 
the employees and revenue of related firms. 
More often than not, this analysis results in 
a determination that changes a company’s 
size status from small to “other than small” 
without any actual change in that firm’s 
employee count or revenues.  
Affiliation is particularly relevant to the 
small business/venture capital relationship 
because SBA frequently finds VCCs to be af-
filiated with not only a single small business, 
but also with the other portfolio businesses 
in which they invest.7 This concept is vital 
for small businesses and venture capital 
investors to understand because once a 
small firm is deemed affiliated with a VCC, it 
will often exceed SBA’s size standards, lose 
its small business size status, and can no 
longer compete for set-aside work. This is 
likely to make the business a less profitable 
enterprise and a less attractive investment.
How does SBA calculate affiliation? The 
answer is not entirely clear and is generally 
very fact-specific. In cases where the small 
business is not majority owned by a single 
investor, SBA regulations note merely that 
it will examine the “totality of the circum-
stances” to determine if two (or more) 
businesses should be considered affiliated, 
and thus a single entity.8 The regulations 
do, however, list some factors that, when 
present, increase the risk of two businesses 
being found to be affiliated. These factors 
include: 
  Control, 
  Ownership, 
  Management, and 
  Contractual relationships.9  
When VCCs invest in small businesses, the 
“control” factor often results in a finding of 
affiliation. Most VCCs require some level of 
control as a condition of their investment 
in a particular company. However, because 
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small business set asides minimize competi-
tion, these same investors would prefer that 
the target small business retain its status. 
There is, therefore, a constant struggle 
to strike an appropriate balance between 
protecting an investment without triggering 
the “control” factor and jeopardizing the 
small business’s size status.10 Complicating 
this issue further is the fact that, for the 
purposes of affiliation, it does not matter 
whether control is exercised, as long as the 
power to control exists.11  
Typically, a VCC will be found to control, and 
thus be affiliated with, a platform business 
through stock ownership.12 Stock ownership 
may lead to affiliation under a variety of cir-
cumstances, including when an entity owns 
a block of stock that is larger than other 
outstanding blocks of voting stock.13 That 
said, ownership of less than 50 percent of the 
voting stock of an entity is not a safe haven 
from affiliation.14 Rather, if two or more 
individuals or entities own, control, or have 
the power to control less than 50 percent 
of a business’s voting stock, SBA may make 
the counterfactual presumption that both 
individuals or entities control or have the 
power to control a small business.15 One ca-
veat to this is that if a business’s voting stock 
is widely held and no single block of stock 
is “large” (when compared with all other 
holdings), the business’s board of directors 
and CEO or president will, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, be deemed to have 
the power to control the business.16
Control and affiliation may also be attrib-
uted to individuals who do not own stock 
in a particular concern.17 For example, VCC 
investors will often require that employees 
of a particular fund serve on the board of 
portfolio companies. This is risky because 
SBA will find two concerns to be affiliated 
when one or more officers, directors, or 
general partners of one concern control the 
board of directors and/or the management 
of one or more other concerns.18 A further 
twist on this concept is that interests may 
be combined based on “identity of interest.” 
Individuals with an “identity of interest” 
affiliation may be found when individuals 
or firms that have identical or substantially 
identical business or economic interests 
(such as family members, individuals or 
firms with common investments, or firms 
that are economically dependent through 
contractual or other relationships) are 
treated as one party because such interests 
are aggregated.19 This determination may be 
rebutted with evidence that demonstrates 
the interests are separate.20
Another complication is that control can 
be either “affirmative” or “negative.”21 
Affirmative control is straightforward and 
will be found by SBA if, for example, the VCC 
owns the majority of voting stock, controls 
the board of directors, or if VCC approval is 
necessary before the company can make 
certain business decisions.22 Negative 
control, on the other hand, involves more 
subtle factors and may be challenging for 
VCC investors that rely on indirect methods 
to protect investments in portfolio compa-
nies. SBA’s regulations provide that a con-
cern has negative control and is affiliated 
35
Venture Capital inVestment and small Business affiliation rules
when, “though lacking affirmative ability 
to approve actions, it can block corporate 
action by the other concern.”23 In determin-
ing whether a concern has negative control 
over another concern, SBA considers the 
following factors: 
  Whether the affiliate has veto power, 
  Can block or deadlock the board’s ac-
tions, or 
  Can prevent a quorum at the share-
holder or board of directors meetings.  
SBA will also address the size of the other 
blocks of stock, whether there are any 
agreements that limit the amount of control 
the affiliate has over the concern,24 and the 
number of directors the alleged affiliate has 
on the board.25  
While many venture capital firms have 
raised creative arguments to avoid find-
ings of affiliation, most have failed. For 
example, many VCCs have argued that they 
are exempt from affiliation based on the 
exception found at 13 C.F.R. §121.103(b)(5)
(i) “for venture capital operating companies 
(VCOCs) that provide financial, management, 
or technical assistance under the Small 
Business Investment Act of 1958.” This argu-
ment has repeatedly failed because SBA’s 
regulations explicitly limit the exception to 
“VCOCs,” as defined by the Department of 
Labor regulations.26
VCCs have also argued that their passive 
“control” in a small business does not con-
stitute affiliation, but this claim has been 
repeatedly rejected by SBA.27 According to 
SBA, it is not relevant that VCCs are passive 
investors if they have the potential to con-
trol a small business.28 For example, in Size 
Appeal of TSP TWO, Incorporated, the con-
tractor argued that it was not affiliated with 
two different companies—one of which was 
a holding company.29 The holding company 
owned 74 percent of the contractor’s stock 
and characterized itself as an “investment 
entity” without an active role in the man-
agement or operation of the contractor’s 
business.30 SBA determined that the holding 
company was an affiliate for purposes of 
SBA size determinations, basing its finding, 
in part, on the fact that the regulations 
consider an entity “affiliated” if it controls 
or has power to control 50 percent or more 
of the contractor’s voting stock.31   
The affiliation rules place VCCs in a difficult 
position. By their nature, VCCs not only 
invest but want to participate to varying de-
grees in the management of their portfolio 
businesses.32 A VCC cannot own a majority 
of the small concern’s stock or assume a 
majority position on the board of a small 
government contractor, however, because 
of the risk that a target small business will 
be found affiliated with the company and 
each of its portfolio businesses. Moreover, 
under SBA’s current interpretation of its 
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regulations, VCCs cannot safely install 
market-standard negative covenants 
without risking a negative control finding. 
This regulatory strait jacket is a significant 
impediment to investment, which limits 
the growth of small businesses involved in 
government contracting.33
Current 
legislatiVe 
and exeCutiVe 
initiatiVes in 
support of 
Venture Capital
Recent legislative changes proposed by Con-
gress and statements made by the Obama 
administration suggest a more favorable 
view toward the small business/venture 
capital relationship. On the legislative front, 
Congress has proposed amendments to 
the Small Business Act that would permit 
VCCs to invest in small businesses with-
out triggering affiliation.34 The proposed 
amendments apply to small businesses that 
participate in the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program. The SBIR program 
ensures that small, high-tech, innova-
tive businesses receive a significant portion 
of the federal government’s research and 
development funds.35 Current SBIR regula-
tions require participating small businesses 
to be at least 51-percent owned and con-
trolled by “natural persons” who are either 
U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens of 
the United States36; or, at least 51-percent 
owned and controlled by another business 
concern that is at least 51-percent owned 
and controlled by “natural persons” who are 
either U.S. citizens or permanent resident 
aliens of the United States.  
The SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2009 
included proposed amendments to affilia-
tion designed to encourage venture capital 
investment in small businesses.37 Specifical-
ly, the legislation provided that a business 
concern would not be considered affiliated 
with a VCOC if the VCOC owns less than 50 
percent of the business and employees of 
the VCOC do not constitute a majority of 
the concern’s board of directors.38 Un-
like the current affiliation principles, this 
legislation indicates that affiliation in some 
circumstances may be narrowly tied to 
stock ownership and seats on the board of 
directors. The other factors of affiliation, 
including negative covenants and manage-
ment control, are notably absent from the 
language of the bill. Although this legisla-
tion does not apply to all small businesses, 
it does indicate congressional intent that, 
for SBIR participants receiving specific types 
of venture capital funding, many of the af-
filiation factors may soon no longer apply.  
The Obama administration has also made 
statements that signal its support of ven-
ture capital. The administration has stated 
that it plans to improve the procurement 
system to attract venture capital–backed 
companies39 and increase minority-owned 
business access to venture capital. In addi-
tion, the president has appointed individuals 
with venture-capital backgrounds to several 
key positions; two such examples include 
SBA appointees Karen Mills and Winslow 
Sargeant.40 These appointments indicate 
the administration’s support for venture 
capital. Indeed, Sargeant has specifically 
voiced his support for the inclusion of ven-
ture capital investments in SBIR partici-
pants.41 These factors, while not dispositive, 
imply the administration holds a favorable 
view toward the role of venture capital in 
the procurement system.  
affiliation 
regime and the 
negatiVe impaCt 
on Venture 
Capital
There is no doubt that the current econom-
ic climate has made it difficult for small 
businesses to raise capital from banks and 
other lenders.42 In the federal marketplace, 
this tightening has been exacerbated by 
the fact that the small business contrac-
tors who are able to locate venture capital 
financing are penalized for that support. 
Despite recent initiatives that support 
venture capital investments in small con-
cerns, the current legislative regime limits 
the ability of small businesses to obtain 
capital without impacting their size status. 
This means companies must forgo venture 
capital financing or risk losing eligibility to 
compete for small business set aside con-
tracts and subcontracting opportunities 
with prime contractors who seek to meet 
small business subcontracting goals. As a 
result, some of the most innovative small 
businesses are disqualified from participat-
ing in federal programs simply because 
they receive no venture capital funding.
A close read of the Small Business Invest-
ment Act of 1958 makes it difficult to under-
stand why SBA has failed to exempt VCCs 
from affiliation. Specifically, Section 103 of 
the statute states:  
[A]n investment by a venture capital firm...
(i) shall not cause a business concern to 
be deemed not independently owned and 
operated regardless of the allocation of 
control during the investment period under 
any investment agreement between the 
business concern and the entity making 
the investment; (ii) shall be disregarded in 
determining whether a business concern 
satisfies size standards established pursuant 
to section 3(a)(2) of the Small Business Act; 
and (iii) shall be disregarded in determin-
ing whether a small business concern is a 
smaller enterprise...  
The plain language of this provision appears 
to expressly exempt VCC-owned concerns 
from affiliation rules.  
Created by Congress in 1953, SBA is tasked 
primarily with the role of aiding, counseling, 
assisting, and protecting the interests of 
small business concerns.43 In other words, 
“SBA helps Americans start, build, and grow 
businesses.” Contrary to its founding prin-
ciples, however, SBA’s affiliation rules impair 
the ability of small businesses to obtain cap-
ital.44 Specifically, when small government 
contractors obtain capital infusions from 
VCCs, the investment is likely to change the 
business’s size status to “other than small” 
under SBA size standards.45 This new size 
status may result in the loss of government 
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contracts that have been set aside for small 
businesses or those in which the agency 
requires performance by a small business 
in order to satisfy its small business goals.46 
Moreover, the loss of size status makes the 
business less attractive to prime contrac-
tors interested in the concern only to satisfy 
their small business subcontracting goals. 
This not only eliminates the small business’s 
prime contracting opportunities, but also 
its subcontracting opportunities. 
Although SBA claims the affiliation rules are 
designed to protect the interests of small 
businesses, when VCC investments are 
involved, the result is to the contrary. The 
small business loses its attraction when its 
size status and its size-dependent contracts 
are lost. This result is in direct contraven-
tion of SBA’s policy goals: it harms rather 
than protects small business interests.
a proposal for 
Change
The government currently excludes most 
VCC-backed small businesses from competing 
for small business contracting opportunities, 
regardless of their potential to provide high-
quality products, services, and solutions. 
It is at best illogical that the government 
penalizes small businesses because they have 
demonstrated significant market potential 
and received VCC funding. Well-meaning 
but misapplied small business regulations 
have the practical effect of eliminating small 
businesses that receive VCC backing from 
competing for small business contracts, and 
forces the small businesses to compete 
against large corporations for contracting op-
portunities. Given that small businesses can-
not compete on the same level as their larger 
corporate counterparts, such as Lockheed 
Martin Corporation or General Dynamics, 
the small concerns are likely to lose these 
procurement opportunities and the govern-
ment will lose out on new and advantageous 
business partnerships. 
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Despite their shortcomings, SBA’s affilia-
tion rules should not be eliminated entirely 
because they serve an important purpose. 
The government has an interest in ensuring 
that the small businesses which receive 
set-aside contracts are, in fact, small busi-
nesses. Moreover, the government must 
ensure that legitimate small businesses are 
not forced out of the federal marketplace by 
large businesses using small business fronts. 
The affiliation rules, while clearly over-in-
clusive, are effective in preventing this type 
of activity. At the same time, the current 
affiliation rules are holding many small 
businesses back from 
their potential and are 
limiting the types of 
innovate goods and 
services that can be 
offered to the federal 
government.
To remedy this prob-
lem, the government 
must revise existing 
legislation and regu-
lations to eliminate un-
reasonable restrictions 
on VCC-backed small 
business concerns 
while maintaining a 
regulatory regime that 
protects all small busi-
nesses. While encour-
aging VCC investment, 
an effective proposal 
cannot have the effect 
of squeezing out small businesses that lack 
such financing.47 Rather, the solution that 
we propose attempts to strike a balance 
between these opposing positions. While 
there may be no perfect balance, regulatory 
reform focused on updating the concept of 
affiliation may provide venture capital ac-
cess while maintaining the independence of 
small businesses. This balance, particularly 
during the current economic downturn, will 
provide much needed capital and spur small 
business growth.
One way to optimize venture capital 
involvement in small business government 
contracts is to provide VCC companies 
with a blanket exception to affiliation. 
This solution would permit the partici-
pation of a VCC-backed small business, 
regardless of the percentage of the 
business controlled by a VCC. This type 
of waiver would, however, allow VCCs 
the unfettered ability to create a series 
of business fronts to compete for small 
business set-asides. Large businesses 
could also create private equity funds and 
use these funds to access set-aside work. 
Neither of these scenarios, however, does 
anything to inspire entrepreneurs to start 
small businesses, encourage innovation, 
or promote small business growth. Rather, 
an unlimited VCC affiliation waiver would 
squeeze independent small businesses out 
of government contracts, and consume 
available venture capital.
A more nuanced approach, modeled after 
waivers of the “non-manufacture rule,” 
would have a more salutary effect on 
the type of venture capital activity small 
businesses so desperately need while not 
foreclosing federal contracting opportuni-
ties. Under the “non-manufacture rule,” 
in order to qualify as a small concern for 
a small business set-aside or an 8(a) con-
tract to provide manufactured products, 
an offeror must be the manufacturer of 
the end item.48 SBA may waive non-manu-
facture rule requirements if it “determines 
that no small business manufacturer or 
processor of the product or class of prod-
ucts is available to participate in the fed-
eral procurement market.”49 These waivers 
are specifically tailored to select North 
American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) codes where SBA has determined 
that there are no small business manu-
facturers. This waiver process takes place 
largely in public, with notices required 
to be published in Commerce Business 
Daily and the Federal 
Register before they 
are granted.50 Further, 
these waivers are not 
granted and forgot-
ten. Rather, “non-
manufacture rule” 
waivers are subject to 
challenge by private 
individuals and are 
periodically reviewed 
by SBA.51 
A similar public process 
could be created with 
regard to waiver of 
the affiliation rules 
for VCCs. This system 
would have clear 
benefits over both 
current affiliation rules 
and an overall affilia-
tion waiver. Affiliation 
waivers would be limited to NAICS codes 
in which SBA determines that the class of 
product or service requires significant capi-
tal investments that would not be possible 
without venture capital involvement. For 
example, the venture capital community 
often argues that there should be a blanket 
affiliation waiver for all VCCs because some 
industries, such as biotechnology, require 
significant startup capital that is unlikely 
to be available from traditional sources. 
While a blanket affiliation waiver would be 
over-inclusive, a specific waiver for biotech-
nology-related NAICS codes would increase 
access to venture capital funding while 
limiting crowding out of small businesses 
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in other less capital intensive industries. In 
addition, these waivers have the benefit 
of being the result of public notice and 
comment, which will allow small businesses 
to directly impact the waiver process. The 
waivers, once granted, would be subject to 
periodic review to determine if significant 
venture capital involvement is still required. 
Independent small businesses working 
under specific NAICS codes could also chal-
lenge existing waivers as traditional funding 
becomes available.  
With a NAICS code–based affiliation waiver, 
VCCs would have the freedom to take a 
majority stock position in small businesses. 
VCCs could also impose affirmative and 
negative controls, which are central to 
protection of their investment in risky small 
businesses. These incentives, coupled with 
the ability to compete for small business 
set-asides, have the potential to increase 
venture capital involvement in areas where 
capital is key—especially during this time of 
economic downturn.  
ConClusion
In this harsh economic climate, small 
businesses need assistance to weather the 
rough financial storm and VCC firms bring 
managerial, technical, and financial exper-
tise to their portfolio companies without 
managing the day-to-day operations of 
small concerns. The beneficial nature of this 
relationship should not be hampered by a 
flawed regime based on absolutes which 
excludes VCC-backed small businesses from 
small business contracting opportunities. 
Nydia Velazquez, co-chair of the House 
Small Business Committee, said it best 
when she stated: “small firms must not be 
penalized for accepting investment they 
need to advance their R&D efforts.”52  
An exception to the affiliation rules must be 
made for VCC-backed firms if small busi-
nesses are to succeed in the current market. 
While a blanket exemption is not neces-
sary, limited exemptions based on a firm’s 
particular service or product is more than 
warranted. This solution will allow small 
businesses to obtain much-needed capital, 
while still remaining eligible to compete for 
small business contracts. CM
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